

CONTEXTUALIZING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PAK-AFGHAN BORDERLAND & DISTRICT SWAT TO CONTAIN FOMENTING INSURGENCIES

Asif Salim* & Parveen Khan^Ψ

Abstract

Pakistan's engagement in the global war on terrorism and its role as a frontline ally of the USA compelled strategic elites of the state to develop strategies to curb the militant groups that migrated to Pakistan and took shelter in the borderland areas after the U.S. military offensive Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on Afghanistan. The aim of OEF was to hunt down the Al-Qaeda and other affiliated conglomerates enjoying patronage under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The real challenge before the law enforcement agencies of Pakistan was to get support from the public for military operations against these Islamist militant groups, which were the constant source of threat to the security of the state. The majority of the people in Pakistan were generally not in favor of full-fledged military operations because they saw the militants as holy warriors fighting against the infidels and believed that if Pakistan launched any brand of operation in erstwhile FATA it would be under the diktat of the Americans. This is the reason why, from 2001 to 2004, Pakistan's security forces opened the door for negotiations and did not participate in hard-strikes against the militant outfits. But after the formal formation of Threek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007 and its nexus with Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in Swat started a series of brutal suicide and targeted attacks on the population, it was necessary for the military to begin operations. This timely study of important military operations initiated against the insurgents in the Pak-Afghan borderland will broaden the horizon of security managers about their strategic and tactical flaws in the ground offensive and thorough

*Visiting Lecturer, Department of Political Science University of Peshawar, Peshawar, Pakistan. Email: asifsalim60@gmail.com

^Ψ Assistant Professor, Institute of Educational Research (IER), University of Peshawar, Peshawar, Pakistan. Email: drparveen@uop.edu.pk

analysis will help to provide a better understanding for future military offensives in any part of the country. This paper focuses on important military operations with a cost and benefit analysis of those conducted after 2001 in the adjacent areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and district Swat.

Key Words: Insurgency, Af-Pak Borderland, TNSM, USA, TTP, Al-Qaeda.

Introduction

Jihadists' attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 entirely reshaped not only the world politics but changed the nature of engagements and alliances among the states. After inking a formal alliance General Pervez Musharraf and his team started to hunt down Al-Qaeda members and other affiliated conglomerates. Moreover, under the broader terms of engagement, Pakistan provided air, land and seaport facilities to America and NATO troops. When the combat operations intensified in Afghanistan by the US and NATO troops, the number of local insurgencies abruptly increased in the Pak-Afghan borderland. Therefore, Islamabad was compelled to intercept the militants' proliferation and dismantle their networks. However, it was not an easy task for Pakistani forces, as various local militant groups started to gather under the banner of Therek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007 and built strong bases in various parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A series of violent and brutal attacks were initiated by the militant groups with new techniques and strategies. Particularly, the 'Fadaeen' unite (Suiciders) created havoc inside Pakistan.¹

Rising terrorism, related activities and mass pressure compelled security vanguards to satiate their thrust of revenge. Therefore, several military operations were launched in FATA to wipe out the menace of insurgency and regain the control of the area from the militants. Formally, the military operations started in 2001 in different parts of the country but this paper focuses those operations that were launched in Pak-Afghan borderland. The following are the operations that were solely conducted by Pakistan army with their code names:

- Operation Al-Meezan (2002-2006)
- Operation Zalzala (2008)
- Operation SherDil, Rah-e-Haq, and Rah-e-Rast (2007-2009)
- Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009-2010).
- Operation Zarb-e-Azab (15 June 2015)

¹C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan's War Within," *Survival* 51, no. 6 (December 1, 2009): 161-188.

The factual analyses of these operations reveal that no remarkable objectives were achieved by security forces, no doubt, with the active support and pressure by the US in the borderland area and its adjoining parts by June 2015. But the operations were successful in persuading the militants to sit at the negotiating table. It is important to highlight that in many cases security forces compromised on the humiliating terms and conditions, and faced hard criticism from public and media. Yet it was justified and associated with the peace process. Nevertheless, many agreements were ended in smoke because of the lack of trust between the two parties².



²“Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy. Edited by Paul Gordon Lauren. The Free Press (Macmillan, New York). £16.25,” *International Relations* 6, no. 5 (May 1, 1980): 854–855.

Operation Al-Mizan (Trial Balance)

Operation Al-Mizan was started in 2002 in South Waziristan when militants brazenly attacked a military camp called Azam Warsak in Wana. In this strike nearly thirty soldiers were killed, which severely infuriated military establishment³. Moreover, during the tenure of Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the Al-Qaeda deputy head issued a religious decree (Fatwa) for the killing of Musharraf. Here the conflicts of interests appeared and a formal military campaign was started in the area. Musharraf was attacked several times by the Taliban and Al-Qaida when he had a narrow escape in suicide attacks⁴. US financial assistance continued to Pakistan to convince the security vanguards to be involved on a massive scale to fight against miscreants in the borderland. This persuasion gave the US an edge to curb anti-American figures in Pakistan. America's financial support was allocated largely to the influential security agencies and the prominent central intelligence agency ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), including police and Frontier Corps (FC) which was approximately \$2 billion per annum⁵. Pakistan deployed its eight thousand military personnel during the campaign of operation Al-Mizan.

It is clear from the historical and operational point of view that all the national forces cannot conduct any operations in the region without the coordination among all divisions to counter the nefarious designs of the enemies. Pakistan's infantry unit needed the support of Pakistan Aviation to meet the challenges in the rocky terrain of FATA. The Air Force played a significant role in air-strike attacks on militants. Moreover, it also provided logistics support, and medium transportations specifically in the year 2002. Waziristan and Tochi scouts were involved in operational exercises in the Pak-Afghan borderland. For the regular operational activities, the Special Services Group (SSG) and other regular troops were used to control the situation. On actual ground, some of the military check posts were placed in Waziristan. Moreover, the task was given to political agents and other civil high ups authorities to identify the supporters who provide the assistance to the militants in Waziristan. The traditionally chosen heads of the village (Malaks) were taken in confidence to identify the indigent militants who were in cooperation with the foreigners in their localities. An estimated

³M. Ilyas Khan, "Descent into Anarchy," *The Herald*, March 2004, 62.

⁴Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, First Edition edition. (New York: Viking, 2008), 270.

⁵Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, "When \$10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy Toward Pakistan," *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 7–19.

seventy militants were identified by the natives who were from the renowned tribe of Ahmadzai⁶.

In March 2004, in the military siege of West Wana, where the army was facing the real challenge of the militants, one Army officer and fifteen FC soldiers were killed. Further, irreparable losses related to finance and transportation occurred in the military conveyances in the area of the Ahmad Zai tribe. In the areas of Kari Kot, Shin Warsak and DzhaGundai, forces faced severe resistance. The tribal's tug of war with the militants compelled the military to spread their forces by a further 50 kms. First, the surgical operations required seven hundred soldiers, then the number exceeded to the maximum strength of seven thousand soldiers to encircle the insurgents. This operation included the air-strike support from the Pakistan Air Force in which they used choppers and other jets against the militants. In the end, the chief of the operation announced triumph over the militants in Wana⁷.

Launching the operation in Kalosha, Pakistani forces destroyed the hidden entrenchments and other depots of the militants in the locality. During the operations, numerous sorts of military paraphernalia were captured by the forces. Despite this, the major channel of communications of Al-Qaeda in Kalosha was also dismantled. After this military action, terrorists dispersed secretly from Kalosha. Yet, some of the local groups were still attacking the military in the areas such as Barmal, AngoorAdda, Laddha, Shawal etc. The military, therefore, established garrisons, which, later on, created an extreme level of rage among the people of Kalosha⁸. Apart from this, the influence of the foreign militants in Shakai Valley had increased. Not only the US but also Pakistan's intelligence reports were given to the Pakistan Army to initiate a full force strategy against the militants chiefly in opposition to Uzbeks, Chechens and other local inhabitants of the village where over 200 hundred foreigners were involved in insurgency-related activities. In 2004, forces formally expanded operation Al-Mizan in adjacent parts of South Waziristan. Militants' hideouts were targeted by air strikes in Madakhel and Dhog village, in which one of the most wanted members of Al-Qaeda

⁶David Witter, "Operation al Mizan Pdf - Google Search," accessed November 27, 2017, https://www.google.com/search?ei=gGQbWv3mFMSe_QbW3bD4DA&q=operation+al+mizan+pdf&oq=operation+almizan+&gs_l=psy-ab.1.3.35i39k1j0i13k112j0i22i30k1.2538.9041.0.13651.36.26.0.0.0.127.2110.13j10.24.0...0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..17.19.1933.6..0j46j0i67k1j0i20i264k1j0i20i263k1j0i131k1j0i3k1j0i46k1j0i10k1.161.m3R717Z9bIQ.

⁷M. Ilyas Khan, "Who Are These People," *The Herald*, April 2004, 60–68.

⁸SailabMahsud, "Caught in the Crossfire," *The Herald*, April 2004, 67–68.

Hamza Rabia was killed. He was the main operative member in the group, running the affairs of Al-Qaeda in the region⁹.

The operation came to an end in 2004 particularly in Kalosha. The government and the militants signed an agreement under the patronage of Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa information minister - and the other fifty members of the Jirga (Tribal Elders). The council also consisted of the members from the famous religious political party JUI (F). The fundamental objective of the agreement was to pacify the circumstance and to prevent the collateral harm on both sides in the area.

It is pertinent to mention here the role of clergy in the pacification process in traditional societies like Pakistan. The final negotiation between government and militants was held on 27th March 2004 in Waziristan. The negotiation process was attended by Mufti Naik Muhammad, Mufti Sharief Muhammad and thirty-three other competent religious personnel from Deoband Seminary group and tribal leaders from ZaliKhail tribe adjacent to Wana¹⁰. Since, traditionally, Jirga is held in public places, but for the sake of sanctity and to give due importance to the clergy, the agreement was signed in the religious seminary. The agreement required all the foreigners to formally register themselves with the government, non-interference of the Army in areas of borderland, the military would be confined to their barracks as militants would not attack on the forces in the area, and militants would refrain to attack government installations.¹¹

Arguably the agreement was entirely favouring the militants rather than the security forces, therefore, renowned journalist and expert of Pak-Afghan affairs Rahimullah Yousufzai presented his view in the following words:

“This is very important in the tribal context because an army general [General Safdar Hussain] is going to Nek Mohammad Wazir’s place. Instead of the militants coming to the army, the army is going to their place, which means they recognize their strength and their influence. Then you go to a Madrassa, which was, in a way, one of the headquarters of the militants.”¹²

The fallacy was stated that the army forces came after Naik Muhammad and he did not approach the forces to make an agreement. This presents the

⁹Rahimullah Yousafzai, “Whose Country Is It Anyway,” *The Herald*, February 2006, 27–32.

¹⁰“Aliens Asked to Surrender by 30th,” *Dawn* (Karachi, April 25, 2004).

¹¹“Aliens Asked to Surrender by 30th.”

¹²Rahimullah Yousafzai, “Interview with Naik Muhammad,” *Frontline*, October 3, 2006.

power of the militant in the area.¹³ After this agreement he was assassinated by US military through an air-strike in Waziristan. No doubt he portrayed himself as a powerful entity in the area but immediately after his death a trust deficit emerged and the agreement ended within the short period of six months.

Nevertheless, operation Al-Mizan could not achieve its settled objectives. Foreign militants joined hands with the local militants and started to increase their influence in the area by eliminating the traditional role of ‘Maliks’ and replaced them with a theocratic class. As, the operation was restricted to the battlefield the objectives could not be achieved. Furthermore, many religious political parties in Pakistan were entirely in support of the militants and glamorized them as great ‘Jihadests’ who are fighting against the infidel army in Afghanistan *vis-a-vis* in borderland area. Apart from this, the agreement also could not achieve the objective of reconciliation and peace in the region. This fact was acknowledged by the interior ministry while giving a briefing to General Pervez Musharraf on national security policy:

*“Talibanisation has not only unfolded potential threats to our security, but is also casting its dark shadows over Pak-Afghan borderland and now in the settled areas adjoining the tribal belt. The reality is that it is spreading.”*¹⁴

The hard fact cannot be overlooked that the increased influence of the militants in borderland had established the parallel government in a large part of the area. Militants were using the occupied areas as their unbeatable sanctuaries to ambush NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, with the passage of time people were walking away from their tribal elders or ‘Maliks,’ inspired by the Taliban’s Ex-Chief Mullah Muhammad Omar. For miniaturizing the governmental authority, militants adopted very systematic approach. At initial stages they declared a ban on the use of multi-media equipment for example, TV, radio etc and later on they imposed the condition of beard in the regional residential areas and started killing the pro-government tribal leaders. However, despite of all these harsh attempts, militants were gaining support among the local population by introducing a judicial system, which was able to provide faster justice compared to the justice provided by the government.

¹³Iqbal Khattak, “I Did Not Surrender to the Military, Says Nek Mohammad,” *Friday Times* (Lahore, April 30, 2004).

¹⁴Iqbal Khattak, “I Did Not Surrender to the Military, Says Nek Mohammad.”

It would not be wrong to say that operation Al-Mezan was started with full sincerity. Number of Al-Qaeda members were arrested and killed but in the meantime the operation gave space for the local militant groups to build a stronghold in Pak-Afghan borderland. After 2007 the militants were in position to negotiate with the government on equal footing because at a local level they were controlling the political, social and economic system under their strict guidelines.

Operation Zalzala (Earthquake)

In September 2006, General (Ret) Jan Mohammad Orakzai, Governor of KPK, took some initiatives for negotiation with militants operating in borderland area. He entered into an agreement with Taliban in North Waziristan (Miranshah). The agreement consisted of the provision that tribal Maliks would not be targeted and kidnapped. Neither will they attack the Pakistani forces nor the Afghan forces so peace could be maintained.¹⁵ However, these talks met the same fate as those of previous agreements. The militants' activities were much more hostile in the region. Criminal activities like kidnapping, robberies, injuries and killings were continuing to enhance their area of influence. Khasadars, (Local Militia) were not in the position to counter the nefarious acts of militants. All these developments were indicative signs of their power in area, chiefly in North Waziristan.

It is an obvious phenomenon that instability in the region affects the adjacent areas too. The same thing occurred in South Waziristan where the peace talks were not successful and security forces started an operation with the code name "Zalzala" (Earthquake). The core purpose of the operation was to wipe out the militants from the local areas. South Waziristan was entirely occupied by the militants under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. Before launching formal military operations, the government took initiatives for peace and it seemed to be successful when the Sararogha agreement was formally signed in 2005 with Bait Ullah-Mehsud. But this agreement came to end in August 2007 when tensions rose due to the trust deficit between the militants (Taliban) and Security forces in South Waziristan (Dawn, 2014).¹⁶

It is important to mention here the distinctive strategy adopted by security forces to counter Baith Ullah-Mehsud from his arch competitor Mulla Nazir. The government came into an agreement with Mullah Nazir to expel the foreign militants from the Waziristan agency and to regain the areas which were under the control of Baith Ullah forces. No doubt that the government

¹⁵ Muhammad Ilyas Khan. "Descent into Anarchy." *The Herald*, Karachi, March 2006.

¹⁶ "Waziristan Operation Go Ahead." *Dawn* (Karachi, April 18, 2010).

was in cooperation with Mullah Nazir but media brought the military relations with Mullah Nazir into the limelight in front of the entire nation which, later on, fractured the military strategy in the area¹⁷. During the span of cooperation, Mullah Nazir forces extracted multiple benefits as a counter-balance force against TTP, seizing strategic hilltops and rooting out the foreigners.¹⁸ Apart from this, the whole year was full of chaos in term of militants' violence. The episode of Lal Mosque and assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto further worsened the law and order situation and the writ of the government was questioned. People were demanding forceful military operations to weed out the militants not only from the borderland but also from the settled areas. Media networks confirmed the reports of the intelligence apparatus that there were close nexuses between the Taliban and Lal Mosques' authorities. It was also confirmed that Baith Ullah-Mehsud was the mastermind behind Benazir Bhutto's assassination.¹⁹

In this operation, almost all the divisions of Pakistan's army participated. The ultra-modern technological electrical equipment was brought into use to prevent the occurrence of the Improvised Explosives Devices (IED)²⁰. Nonetheless, the discredited campaign against the military was at a peak. Militants were not only physically involved in the area to malign the Pakistan army but were powerfully using social media to attract the public and instil hatred in minds of the local populace against Pakistani forces²¹. Arguably, the forces were getting stronger and in a limited time cleared many areas which were previously in the control of militants, especially Spinkai, perceived to be the stronghold of TTP, was successfully taken back. But many local clerics issued the 'Fatwa' that Jihad against Pakistani soldiers is permissible because they come in the category of infidels who are fighting inside with the US in borderland area²².

There is no denial of the fact that the Zalazla operation was relatively more costly in terms of finances and damages than previous operations. People of South Waziristan faced acute troubles because of heavy shelling. Despite this, heavy displacement occurred during the operation. Two hundred

¹⁷Ismail Khan and Alamgir Bhattani, "442 Uzbeks among 58 Dead: Fierce Clashes in S. Waziristan," *Dawn* (Karachi, March 21, 2007).

¹⁸Rahimullah Yousafzai, "Eviction or Safe Passage," *Newsline* (Karachi, May 2007).

¹⁹Joby Warrick, "CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination," *Washington Post* (Washington D.C., January 18, 2008).

²⁰Iqbal Khattak, "Army in Waziristan Better Equipped, More Relaxed," *Daily Times* (Lahore, May 21, 2008).

²¹Iqbal Khattak, "Pakistan: Mehsud Says Local Taliban to Begin Media War; Slams Reporter's Murder," *Daily Times* (Lahore, May 29, 2008).

²²Zaffarabbas, "Taliban Ousted, But Spinkai Is Now a Ghost Town," *Dawn* (Karachi, November 8, 2008).

thousand people migrated from South Waziristan to adjacent areas especially from Sarawakai, Splitol, Malai etc. Moreover, the distinctive feature of this operation was that it was closely observed by the high political, military and intelligence heads so as to make it more productive.²³

The dividends of the operation can be measured through the results, which were achieved by the security forces. Major militants' camps and other training spots were eliminated. Suicide bomb jackets were found and then disposed of by the security forces. The teenagers who were brainwashed were also exposed before the media.

Arguably, the operational activities were mostly successful in the sense of capturing the strategically important territorial parts in Waziristan but later on the forces decided to withdraw from the area, which provided space to the militants for revitalization. The suicide trainings in Spinkai Village were at its peak. One of the camps was run by Qari Hussain Mehsood who was renowned for recruiting suicide bombers.²⁴ On the other hand, tribal people expressed aggressive resentment for the national forces because of the execution of collective punishment policy on entire tribe. This approach caused irrevocable loss to the intelligence support for the military from the locals which later on adversely affected operational activities of the forces in the area²⁵.

Operation Sher-Dil (Lion's Heart)

This operation was initiated particularly in Bajur in August 7, 2008 against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda outfits. The concerned authorities were deeply worried about the permeating insurgency in the area. The then federal government with the consultation of provincial government and law enforcement agencies decided to launch the military operation against insurgents with clear objectives to defeat them. The FC commanded Major General Tariq Khan and 26th Infantry Brigade took part in the operation. It was decided that the spread of insurgency would be encountered with iron hand and writ of the government would be established. The militants' networks would be dismantled and immediate retaliatory response.

In the meantime, the militants' activities had multiplied the attacks on the apparatus of law enforcement agencies. In March 2007, a high profiled ISI

²³Zulfiqar Ali, "Over 4,000 Houses Destroyed in Waziristan Operation," *Dawn* (Karachi, November 8, 2008).

²⁴Amir Mir, "Story Behind Manawan Fidayee Attack," *The News* (Karachi, April 1, 2009).

²⁵Stephen Graham, "Ghost Village Haunts Pakistani Plans to Make Peace with Tribal Militants," *Associated Press* (New York, May 19, 2008).

official along with some tribal figures lost their lives in an unknown raid by the militants in Bajaur agency. The attack infuriated the officials and they struck back with full force and inflicted heavy loss to militants²⁶.

The tug of war between the militants and law enforcement agencies became bloodier with each passing day. A series of suicide attacks were carried out by the militants on military, intelligence, and police personnel. Many suicide attempts were made on Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi. In September 2007, suicide bombers hit a forty seat bus carrying ISI personnel in Rawalpindi. In this attack seventeen officials died and many were badly injured. The second bloodiest suicide attack was carried out in the Royal Artillery bazaar. The bazaar was used by the military as routes to reach the headquarters. In this attack, eight officials were killed.

In operation Sher-Dil, heavy artillery was used with the active support of tanks and jets. Because of heavy shelling the militants were backed secretly and crossed the Afghan border from Bajaur. The forces found enormous underground channels, which connected lots of houses secretly. Many houses were bulldozed by the military, which were used by the militants. As one of the Pakistan army member stated;

*“They have good weaponry and a better communication system than ours. . . . Their tactics are mind-boggling and they have defenses that would take us days to build. It does not look as though we are fighting a rag-tag militia; they are fighting like an organized force.”*²⁷

Overall the operation was successful in the context of confiscating the explosives, ammunitions, propaganda literature for brainwashing, radio frequencies, equipment etc. The stronghold of communication networks was soiled by the Army in Bajaur. This phenomenon ended in December 2008. An estimated one thousand militants and sixty three soldiers were martyred in the operation Sher-Dil²⁸.

There is no denial of the fact that larger parts of the agencies were cleared by the forces, but for maintaining peace it was important to form local militia. The fundamental motive behind forming these kinds of militia was to protect strategically important arteries of the area and to guard the tribal community from militants' attacks. Salar Zai tribe was the first, which formed the

²⁶Anwar Ullah Khan, “ISI Official, Three Others Killed in Bajaur Ambush,” *Dawn* (Karachi, March 28, 2007).

²⁷Ismail Khan, “Battle to Be Won or Lost in Bajaur,” *Dawn* (Karachi, September 21, 2008).

²⁸Anthony Lloyd, “Captured Battle Plan Shows Strength and Training of Taliban Forces,” *The Times* (London, November 11, 2008).

Laskaar against the militants like Dara Adam Khail tribe and Orakzai tribe. However, on 6th November, a bloody attack carried out on the Jirga caused the killing of twenty members. This was the first invincible revengeful act from the militants inside Bajaur to give them a message for their allegiance to the law enforcement agencies. But the military continued to support militia and dropped leaflets in the parts of Mohmmad to counter the militants through Lashkars. The operation came to an end on 28th February 2009.

Operation Rah-E-Haq (Path Of Truth)

In late 2007, Therik-i-Nifaz-e Shariati-Muhammadi (TNSF) started to wreak havoc in the valley of Swat to control the district and impose its own version of sharia'h. TNSM's leader Mulana Sufi Muhammad started his activities with the collaboration of Taliban factions in the area and demanded strict and forceful implementation of laws based on self-explanatory Islamic principles. There was a complete ban on education for women, and closure of barber shops and music shops was the foremost agenda of the organization. Moreover, TNSM threatened people of the valley not to vaccinate children otherwise they will severely be penalized.²⁹ The government apparatus observed that religious propagation and increase in political stature of the organization was to become a hard-hitting threat for the national government and the legal authority of the state was at the lowest ebb in the area. Therefore, the decision for moving forward with the military operation was taken in Swat with the code name of Operation Rah-e-Haq. The aim of the operation was to contain the increasing nefarious activities of TNSM and to clear the area from Taliban forces which were going to control strategically important hilltops in the valley³⁰.

Basically, the Swat military operation consisted of three phases. In the first phase operation Rah-e-Haq was initiated in late November 2007. Initially, intensity of the operation was kept near to the ground and forces with the assistance of local population conducted numerous search operations and cordon of the areas to curb the militants. However, contrary to this, the role of TNSM was rapidly growing in the Swat valley. In July 2008, approximately thirty police personnel and the members of paramilitary forces were expelled from various check points in Mengorah and other areas of Swat by TNSM. The militants completely occupied the flood plain side of the Swat River, which is connected with Hindu Kush Mountains, while

²⁹SumirPuri, "Pakistan's War on Terrorism: Strategies for Combating Jihadist Armed Groups Since 9/11," *Routledge* (2012).

³⁰Sumir Puri, "Pakistan's War on Terrorism: Strategies for Combating Jihadist Armed Groups Since 9/11."

Pakistan's law enforcement agencies controlled roadside and forest hills. Thus, in a nutshell, Taliban insurgents were controlling the larger part of Swat valley and running the administration with their own local governors in ThesilKabal, Matta and Khawazakhela.³¹

On November 12 2007, 5,000 soldiers of twelfth Regular Army were sent to Swat for the assistance of paramilitary and police which were already fighting the insurgents in the valley. There is no denial of the fact that the Pakistan Army launched a number of operations to counter the militants' expansionism and their spread of reprehensible designs in the valley which was in their tight control. Nevertheless, on November 15, militants started a progression from Swat with the goal to occupy district Shangla. That day Alpuri -- the headquarter of Shangla - fell into the hands of militant forces. As the militants were equipped with lethal arms and ammunition and moving towards the town, the police force ran away from their check posts without fighting. Therefore, the military immediately turned the concentration of their operations from Swat to Shangla to regain the area from the insurgents and to impede their further expansion. By November 17, nearly 100 insurgents were killed in the battles with the forces. On November 25, senior Taliban leaders took the decision to leave Alpuri because of the presence of huge number of Pakistani infantry forces. The Taliban left Alpuri and took up positions on the peaks around the town. On November 26, the Pakistan Army succeeded not only to kill the top two commanders in the valley of Swat because of heavy artillery shelling but recovered numerous vital peaks from the Taliban and drove them back from district of Swat. On November 27, the Pakistan army secured Shangla.³²

The third phase of Rah-e-Haq was initiated to regain the control of the areas which were still in the control of Taliban forces. Matta, Khwazakhela, Charbagh and other sensitive areas were still under the command of Taliban and Pakistan forces were not able to enter into these areas. The Pakistani forces were largely concentrated to keep strong control over Imam Dheri, Kuza Banda, Bara Banda and Nigwalai. In the fierce battle militants retreated from the area and took shelter in nearby areas. The forces seized the hilltops and soon took over Kabal district from them. The Taliban were not in the position to further resist Pakistani forces therefore they vacated Swat and left all the police stations and government buildings which they had seized before. The forces completely dismantled the communications

³¹Rohan Gunaratna and Khuram Iqbal, *Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero* (London: Reaktion Books, 2011).

³²Gunaratna and Iqbal, *Pakistan*.

networks of the militants and destroyed the Radio Stations including the one run by Mulana Fazlullah.³³

The successes of the forces were not limited by this. On November 28, the headquarters of Mulana Fazlullah Imam Dheri and Alpuri was cleared of militants. Later on, militants were completely expelled even from the parts of Matta, Khwazakhela and Madyan. Charbagh 27 km away from Mingora was considered the stronghold of the militants was also cleared by the forces. However, the forces followed the militants with a bomb disposal squad to sweep the areas of mines and booby traps. On December 5, Swat, Matta and Khwazakhela were entirely in the hands of Pakistani forces but fighting still continued with militants in various parts of the valley.³⁴

Operation Rah-E-Rast (Path of Righteousness)

First Swat operation was coming to an end with the agreement between the government and Taliban forces to establish the Qazi courts and Shariat appellate bench of Supreme Court in Malakand Division. Reciprocally the Fazlullah group agreed to observe a ceasefire. But later on, Asif Ali Zardari the then president of Pakistan changed the agreement to allow the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. This step was strictly rejected by TNSM and once again they took up arms against the government. Moreover, NATO and Amnesty International sternly criticized the agreement with the plea that the agreement will provide space for regrouping the Taliban factions and human rights abuses will be increased in the region. Upcoming events proved true the concerns of the authorities.³⁵

Thus, fierce fighting started between the Taliban and law enforcement agencies over the control of Swat in May 2009. Therefore, this time around the government decided for the complete elimination of terrorist outfits with establishing peace in the region. The Pakistan army launched a full-fledged military operation in May 2009 with the code name of Operation Rah-e-Rast. In this operation the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air force jointly strike the militant outfits. Further, according to UNHCR report approximately 2,00,000 people were flown from the region and supported Pakistan Army operation³⁶.

Mangora, which was considered to be the hub of militants, was targeted by Pakistani special commandos. Militants, which were three hundred in

³³(<https://web.archives.org>, 2017).

³⁴Gunaratna and Iqbal, *Pakistan*, 87.

³⁵Gulam Farroq, *Daily Times* (Lahore, 2009).

³⁶Gulam Farroq.

numbers, took positions in the deserted buildings which were captured. By May 23, 2009, large parts of the city were regained as well as control over the important intersections and squares by Pakistan Army. The then ISPR Major-General Athar Abbas on May 30th, announced the victory of the forces over the militants in Mangora but at the same time he stated that the military is committed to follow and eliminate the Taliban leadership from the area. Militants were attacking the forces from the outskirts of Mangora city yet the army compelled them to vacate these small pockets. It was estimated that in Mangora fighting 1,200 insurgents were killed and 90 soldiers were martyred.³⁷

After clearing Mangora, the forces expanded the operation and moved towards Malam Jabba and Qambar Bazar where the militants of TNSM were positioned. The military not only retook these areas but also hit the militants in areas of Peochar and in the town of Bahrain in the north of Swat. However, on Jun 4, 2009, it was reported that TNSM leader Mulan Sufi Muhammad has been arrested. But the report was wrong when it revealed that the forces actually arrested the close companions -- Mulana Alam and Ameer Izzat -- of Sufi Muhammad and he is hiding somewhere in outskirts of Swat.

On June 12, fierce fighting took place in the villages of Shatkas and Ghazi Gai after a bomb explosion at mosque in which 38 civilians were killed and nearly a hundred were badly wounded. Militants were surrounded by the Army and paramilitary forces, and the Pakistan Air Force also aided the ground force. Resultantly, militants bore severe losses and their networks were completely smashed. By July 15, the forces had captured the Chuprial and Kabal which were the last strong hubs of militants. After clearing these areas, Internally Displaced People (IDPs) were permitted to turn back to their homes.³⁸

Comparatively, this operation was more successful than the previous operation in Swat (Rah-i-Haq) as the gains were more solid. Muslim Khan and other key members of TNSM were captured and Taliban Leader Mula Fazlullah was hit by air strikes in which he was badly injured but not killed and escaped to Afghanistan. Hayat Ullah Hamayun the key member of Taliban Swat chapter was arrested from Orangi town Karachi. On August 22, it was announced that all the refugees can come back to villages in valley of Swat and other adjacent districts (<https://www.geo.tv/>, 2017).

³⁷“Militants’ Surrender,” *Pakistan News* (Lahore, August 22, 2009).

³⁸(<https://www.geo.tv/>, 2017).

Operation Rah-E-Nijaat (Path to Salvation)

Operation Zalzala in Waziristan could not provide the fruitful results it expected. Baitullah Mehsod the founder of TTP was expanding its influence in Waziristan. From 2005 to 2009 TTP was targeting every nook and corner of the country. The total numbers of attack recorded were 2148. The nature of these attacks was pertinent to religious, sectarian and political.³⁹ In the mid of 2009, the government and security vanguards decided for rock-hard military offensive against the local and foreign insurgents in South Waziristan.

The significant objective of operation Rah-e-Nijaat was to dismantle the TTP network in South Waziristan and to capture foreign conglomerates which are freely operating in the area. TTP became more influential when it gained the support of Alizai tribe (the clan of Baitullah Mehsod's tribe). However, Shaman khel and Bahlolzai tribes were in opposition to TTP. COAS General Ashfaq Kiyani categorically stated that the military actions are all anti-foreigners and local terrorist outfits and not against veteran Mehsod tribe of Waziristan.⁴⁰ In 2009, the Pakistan Army with the support of Air Force initiated both surgical and non-surgical strikes in the area. The US also supported this operation and provided intelligence reports. On August 5, 2009 Baitullah Mehsud was targeted and killed in a drone attack in South Waziristan. After his death Hakeem Ullah Mehsod was enthroned to lead the TTP, but his days were numbered too. He was also killed in the same way as his predecessor on January 2010. Yet, the killings of the leaders could not stop TTP violence and it was gradually increasing. Five officials from the World Health Organization (WHO) were killed when a suicide bomber entered an office located in the capital city of Islamabad on October 5, 2010. In the next week that October, a suicide blast killed more than fifty civilians. The situation worsened when militants attacked dramatically the Military General Headquarters (GHQ). The incident completely shook the top brass of security apparatus and they sternly commenced ground operations on October 17, 2009, in Waziristan.

The major objective of the ground offensive was to capture the strongholds of TTP in Ladha, Sararogaha, and Makin. By striking these areas security high ups were aware of the backlash from militants. The command and control structure of TTP was much stronger in Sararogha compared to the other parts of agencies⁴¹. Therefore, the first step was taken by the forces to

³⁹*Pakistan Security Report 2008* (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2009).

⁴⁰Ifikhar A. Khan, "Kayani Writes to Mehsuds, Seeks Tribe's Support," *Dawn* (Karachi, October 20, 2009).

⁴¹"Street Battles Rage in Uzbek Militants' Stronghold," *Dawn* (Karachi, November 2, 2009).

clear the roads and other major routes which connect Sararogha and other villages for instance Ahmadwam, Ragha etc.⁴²

Although, the military faced a backlash from the militants, an active preparedness saved them from heavy damage. However, an intense response by the security forces caused profound casualties in AlizaiMehsood tribe Kaniguram.⁴³ Apart from this, Army warned the Nazir Tribe and Mulla Gul Bahadar to stop their assistance and rescind their agreements with TTP. In a grand strategy, the army also encouraged the local Lashkars to hunt down the militants so as weed them out from the area. With the active support of the Lashkars, military empowered to control the most important areas which were before under the control of the militants such as Makin, Sararogha and Ladha.⁴⁴ Ultimately, TTP commanders decided to move to the adjacent areas of South Waziristan like Khyber and Orakzai from where they are able to retaliate the forces. By the end of 2010 many important members of TTP had crossed Afghanistan border and took shelter in Paktika.⁴⁵

As for the success of Rah-I-Nijat, the forces controlled the militants major line of communications, dismantled to the network at gross level and regained most of the villages for instance, Ladha, Makin, Sararogha from them in South Waziristan in a very short span of time. Besides, vast depots of lethal weapons were seized by the military by the end of 2010.⁴⁶ However, the strength of TTP remained intact as the militants escaped to the bordering areas of Afghanistan for refuge.

Contrary to this, the militants' strikes were in full swing which created general disappointment among the masses about the viability of the operation especially in the South Waziristan. Militants attacked a Rawalpindi mosque in which retired and in-service military personnel were praying were killed and injured. This act of violence infuriated the high ups. Furthermore, common populace of the Waziristan was also not happy because of any substantial political, economic and social change occurred in their lives by the end of 2009. IDPs who were settled in the adjacent districts

⁴²ISPR, "Five More Militants Killed in South Waziristan," *Dawn* (Karachi, December 10, 2009).

⁴³Zahid Hussain, "Laddah, Sararogha Cleared; Street Fighting in Making," *Dawn* (Karachi, November 18, 2009).

⁴⁴ISPR, "Fifteen Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation," *Dawn* (Peshawar, December 28, 2009).

⁴⁵"Pakistan Taliban to Increase Suicide Attacks," *Xinhua General News Service*, November 14, 2009.

⁴⁶"Four Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation," *Dawn* (Karachi, January 2, 2010).

such as Dera Ismail Khan and Tank for their protection were not satisfied from the operational activities and facilities provided by the government⁴⁷.

Comparative analysis of 2008 and 2009 show the vast differences which were severely gloomy for the national stability and peace. The total numbers of militants' attacks in 2009 were augmented to 3816 in which 12632 people were killed and 12815 were badly wounded. A 32% increase in the ratio of the militants' attack across Pakistan was recorded. Similarly, there was a 37% increase in mortalities and a 25% increase in total number of injuries across the country right from 2008 afterwards. A 25% increase was also recorded in suicide bombings. In 2009, Pakistan's causality ratio of the civilians exceeded than Afghanistan's civilians.⁴⁸

Operation Zarb-E-Azab (Sharp & Cutting Strike)

On December 16, 2014 a horrific incident took place in Peshawar (Capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). A school run by Army (APS) was attacked by the militants and responsibility was claimed by the TTP. The whole nation was shaken as militants killed the innocent students inhumanely. Political and military leadership sat together in joint All Parties Conference and vowed to take stern action against the militant groups which have established their strong sanctuaries in one of the biggest ex-agency 'North Waziristan'. Full-fledged military offensive was started with the name of 'Zarb-e-Azab on June 15, 2015. In this operation 30,000 soldiers took part and the prime target was to regain the area from the militants which they have control not only in North Waziristan but the adjacent part. The second objective was to continue the operation until the last militant was killed in the area because the militants were using the North Waziristan as a base. They targeted the cities and other governmental and military installations and took refuge in borderland near to North Waziristan⁴⁹. However, this time the long-term objectives were also settled so that long lasting results can be secured. It was decided that for countering the militants' Jihadi counter-narrative would be developed among the local populace through the local clergy and renowned religious scholars. Moreover, the Pak-Afghan border would also be managed because the militants were using the terrain for their operational activities. At the end, a strong nexus would be developed between the government authorities and local elders of North Waziristan so as to manage its affairs viably and no space would be provided in the future for the militants in the area.⁵⁰

⁴⁷“Four Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation.”

⁴⁸“Waziristan Operation Go Ahead,” *Dawn* (Karachi, April 18, 2010).

⁴⁹“Geo News,” *Aapas Ki Baat*, July 2014.

⁵⁰“Geo News,” June 2014.

As it was a fully-fledged military operation in which collateral damage was inevitable. Security forces declared that the local populace must vacate the area so that innocent civilians' lives can be protected. Almost 80,302 families became IDPs and were registered with government authorities. The majority of the refugees' camps were settled in Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Karak, Dera Ismail Khan and Kohat in KP province. The Army was completely on board and pledged that after normalcy in North Waziristan they will rehabilitate the veteran peoples of Waziristan⁵¹.

In this operation, ground forces with the help of air forces targeted the hideouts in North Waziristan and completely destroyed the militants' networks in the area. Apart from this, drone strikes were also used with the active collaboration of the US in Dattakhel and Shawal, which was not possible for the ground army to overcome militants' strongholds here. Nevertheless, as long as the operational success is concerned, the operation Zarb-e-Azab broadly achieved the four objectives. First, TTP and other affiliated foreign conglomerates were struck blatantly and the entire infrastructure and lines of communications were grounded. Second, militants' hideouts and training camps were completely destroyed and sophisticated lethal weaponry were confiscated by the security forces. Third, the areas which were under the control of TTP were retaken and the army hoisted Pakistan's flag. And lastly, Pakistan-US partnership, which had been going into the lowest ebb due to divergence of interests, was recovered because of collaboration in the operation. The Pakistan army captured the hardest peak due to the US drone strikes which were before under the control of the militants.⁵²

Comparatively, the operation Zarb-e-Azab was more results oriented than the other previous operations. It would not be wrong to say that the operation was a game changer in the line of Pakistan's efforts in the war against militants and insurgents. After the operation, militants' strikes immediately declined to the great extent. Although concrete official figures are not available, a 30% decline was recorded in this year compared to 2013.⁵³

⁵¹“Geo News Bulletin,” November 25, 2016.

⁵² (<http://tribune.com.pk/story>), 2017

⁵³ Asad Rahim khan, “Zarb-e-Azab, One Year,” *The Express Tribune*, June 12, 2015.

Conclusion

Since 2001, the performance of the Army regarding the operations is varied. Many areas were cleared which were under the control of militants, but the Army could not sustain its success. Security experts point out the flaws in military operations, such as lack of proper training for counter-insurgency and dearth of sophisticated equipment.⁵⁴ Since Pakistani forces were not involved in counter-insurgency operations before 2001, security forces had limited operational experience against the militants. In operation Al-Mizan, the weaknesses of the military were revealed in terms of clearing and holding of territories. Nevertheless, improvement was seen later on especially in the operations of Sher Dil, Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Nijat. For improving the operational capabilities of the Pakistani forces, the US provided large amounts of financial aid and intelligence sharing.

However, the security vanguards approach was not population centric. Conventional orientation and hardware demands were Indo-centric and lack of awareness of the domestic threat from non-state-actors gave the military a tough time. Moreover, for controlling the domestic violence there is a need for strong military institutions, which were ignored by the successive civilian and military regimes. Even after 2001, in military aid only a tiny part was allocated to police department. Counter-insurgency literature has substantiated the fact that only the institution of the police can ensure the tranquillity in the locality.⁵⁵ Moreover, civil bureaucracy has also failed in the provision of relief to the people of war-torn areas, assistance to IDPs and getting support from the locals during military operations. Owing to this situation, the military was impelled to incline towards a scorched earth policy especially in South Waziristan, Bajur and Swat. The forceful tactical approach created even more resentment in the heart of the people of FATA against the forces and the state.

Apart from this, Islamabad's policy of 'strategic depth' was one of the fundamental factors, which became a source of strength for militants. The Pak-Afghan borderland area was a place where 'proxis' safe sanctuaries were maintained with the objectives to use them in Afghanistan, Kashmir and India. Pakistan's stance was cleared towards some of the militants' organizations which were enjoying the active support of the ISI and military establishment. This strategy undermined the capability of the forces and gave space to militants to strengthen their position on ground. However,

⁵⁴Shuja Nawaz, "FATA--A Most Dangerous Place," last modified January 7, 2009, accessed November 27, 2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/fata-most-dangerous-place>.

⁵⁵Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, "How Terrorist Groups End," Product Page, last modified 2008, accessed November 27, 2017, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741-1.html>.

some of the militants' leaders were killed and captured by the forces which were the part of problem through intelligence sharing and drone strike by the US.⁵⁶

America's policy after 9/11 consisted of 'carrot and stick'. Immediately after the entrance of Pakistan into US-led war on terror, the US lift sanctions, and flow of military and non-military aid was started. However, with the passage of time conflicts of interest emerged on the surface. No doubt, hunting down the Al-Qaeda members and TTP's miscreants Pakistan and the US both were on the same page, but there was a divergent approach towards the Haqqani network and Mullah Omer's Taliban. Pakistan did not consider them a direct threat while by contrast the US and NATO forces were being attacked by these groups in Afghanistan which later on developed a divergent approach by the US and Pakistan.

Last but not least, for any military operational success the support of the people is necessary. From 2001 to 2009 the people's approach to the operations were varied. The majority of the people were not in favour of military operations but after the breaking of the peace deal in Swat and the capturing of Buner by the militants in the middle of 2009, people were actively mobilized and demanded a military operation. Apart from this, another failure lies on the shoulders of civil bureaucracy, which could not rehabilitate the people in conflict areas. IDPs were spread across the country especially in the urban areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This created resentment in the hearts of the people against the government and law enforcement agencies. The fact is that a fruitful result cannot be attained only by initiating military operations, nor until coordinated planning is implemented after the operations.

Bibliography

- Amir Mir. "Story Behind Manawan Fidayee Attack." *The News*. Karachi, April 1, 2009.
- Anthony Lloyd. "Captured Battle Plan Shows Strength and Training of Taliban Forces." *The Times*. London, November 11, 2008.
- Anwar Ullah Khan. "ISI Official, Three Others Killed in Bajaur Ambush." *Dawn*. Karachi, March 28, 2007.
- Asad Rahim Khan. "Zarb-e-Azab, One Year." *The Express Tribune*, June 12, 2015.
- Aysha Saddiq. "In the Line of Fire." *Herald*, December 2006.
- Cohen, Craig, and Derek Chollet. "When \$10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy Toward Pakistan." *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007).

⁵⁶ Aysha Saddiq, "In the Line of Fire," *Herald*, December 2006.

- Fair, C. Christine, and Seth G. Jones. "Pakistan's War Within." *Survival* 51, no. 6 (December 1, 2009): 161–188.
- GulamFarroq. *Daily Times*. Lahore, 2009.
- Gunaratna, Rohan, and Khuram Iqbal. *Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero*. London: Reaktion Books, 2011.
- Iftikhar A. Khan. "Kayani Writes to Mehsuds, Seeks Tribe's Support." *Dawn*. Karachi, October 20, 2009.
- Iqbal Khattak. "Army in Waziristan Better Equipped, More Relaxed." *Daily Times*. Lahore, May 21, 2008.
- . "I Did Not Surrender to the Military, Says Nek Mohammad." *Friday Times*. Lahore, April 30, 2004.
- . "Pakistan: Mehsud Says Local Taliban to Begin Media War; Slams Reporter's Murder." *Daily Times*. Lahore, May 29, 2008.
- Ismail Khan. "Battle to Be Won or Lost in Bajaur." *Dawn*. Karachi, September 21, 2008.
- . "Why the Waziristan Deal Is a Hard Sell." *Dawn*. Karachi, October 14, 2006.
- Ismail Khan, and Alamgir Bhattani. "442 Uzbeks among 58 Dead: Fierce Clashes in S. Waziristan." *Dawn*. Karachi, March 21, 2007.
- ISPR. "Fifteen Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation." *Dawn*. Peshawar, December 28, 2009.
- . "Five More Militants Killed in South Waziristan." *Dawn*. Karachi, December 10, 2009.
- JobyWarrick. "CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassination." *Washington Post*. Washington D.C, January 18, 2008.
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. "How Terrorist Groups End." Product Page. Last modified 2008. Accessed November 27, 2017. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741-1.html>.
- Khan, M. Ilyas. "Descent into Anarchy." *The Herald*, March 2004.
- . "Who Are These People." *The Herald*, April 2004.
- Mahsud, Sailab. "Caught in the Crossfire." *The Herald*, April 2004.
- Rahimullah Yousafzai. "Eviction or Safe Passage." *Newsline*. Karachi, May 2007.
- . "Interview with Naik Muhammad." *Frontline*, October 3, 2006.
- Rashid, Ahmed. *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. First Edition edition. New York: Viking, 2008.
- Shuja Nawaz. "FATA--A Most Dangerous Place." Last modified January 7, 2009. Accessed November 27, 2017. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/fata-most-dangerous-place>.
- Stephen Graham. "GhostVillage Haunts Pakistani Plans to Make Peace with Tribal Militants." *Associated Press*. New York, May 19, 2008.
- SumirPuri. "Pakistan's War on Terrorism: Strategies for Combating Jihadist Armed Groups Since 9/11." *Routledge* (2012).

- Witter, David. "Operation al Mizan Pdf - Google Search." Accessed November 27, 2017.
https://www.google.com/search?ei=gGQbWv3mFMSe_QbW3bD4DA&q=operation+al+mizan+pdf&oq=operation+almizan+&gs_l=psy-ab.1.3.35i39k1j0i13k112j0i22i30k1.2538.9041.0.13651.36.26.0.0.0.0.127.2110.13j10.24.0...0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..17.19.1933.6..0j46j0i67k1j0i20i264k1j0i20i263k1j0i131k1j0i3k1j0i46k1j0i10k1.161.m3R717Z9bIQ
- Yousafzai, Rahimullah. "Whose Country Is It Anyway." *The Herald*, February 2006.
- Zaffarabbas. "Taliban Ousted, But Spinkai Is Now a Ghost Town." *Dawn*. Karachi, November 8, 2008.
- Zahid Hussain. "Laddah, Sararogha Cleared; Street Fighting in Making." *Dawn*. Karachi, November 18, 2009.
- Zulfiqar Ali. "Over 4,000 Houses Destroyed in Waziristan Operation." *Dawn*. Karachi, November 8, 2008.
- "Aliens Asked to Surrender by 30th." *Dawn*. Karachi, April 25, 2004.
- "Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy. Edited by Paul Gordon Lauren. The Free Press (Macmillan, New York). £16.25." *International Relations* 6, no. 5 (May 1, 1980): 854–855.
- "Four Militants Killed in Waziristan Operation." *Dawn*. Karachi, January 2, 2010.
- "Geo News." *Aapas Ki Baat*, July 2014.
- "Geo News Bulletin," November 25, 2016.
- "Militants' Surrender." *Pakistan News*. Lahore, August 22, 2009.
- Pakistan Security Report 2008*. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2009.
- "Pakistan Taliban to Increase Suicide Attacks." *Xinhua General News Service*, November 14, 2009.
- "Street Battles Rage in Uzbek Militants' Stronghold." *Dawn*. Karachi, November 2, 2009.
- "Waziristan Operation Go Ahead." *Dawn*. Karachi, April 18, 2010.